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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2262
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 1018
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0719
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0889
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 1092
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 1205
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0934
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006845

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [SU](#) [IV](#) [FR](#)
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER ON UNSC ELECTIONS, DARFUR
AND COTE D'IVOIRE

REF: A. PARIS 6651 B. 10/12 D'ELIA-ELDRIDGE E-MAIL C.

10/13 D'ELIA-ELDRIDGE E-MAIL D. PARIS 4448
[1](#)E. 10/13 KANEDA-EMBASSY ABIDJAN E-MAIL F.
PARIS 6753 G. 10/13 PLUMB-D'ELIA E-MAIL

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons 1.4b,d

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: DCM met with Presidential African Affairs Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse on October 12 to follow up on French advocacy with Francophone sub-Saharan Africans to bolster the Security Council candidacy of Guatemala. Bonnecorse confirmed his intervention with the AU President and with Gabonese FM, while pledging to expand his outreach efforts. On Darfur Bonnecorse reiterated French concerns about potential destabilization of Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and Chad. Bozize wanted UN forces on C.A.R. territory but Deby had begun equivocating on interpositional forces in Chad. Bonnecorse recounted how Sudanese Presidential Adviser Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin had urged a "third way" between a UN deployment to Darfur under SCR 1706 and the current African Union Mission. Bonnecorse called for stepped-up pressure on Bashir to accept SCR 1706 and appealed for USG efforts to modify the Egyptian position on Sudan. On Cote d'Ivoire, Bonnecorse found the ECOWAS recommendations to the AU to be better than the French had initially believed. He lamented haphazard UNDP budgeting for the UN Elections Representative Stoudmann, whose office was understaffed, and appealed for budgeting directly from the UN. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (C) DCM and Africa Watcher met with Presidential African Affairs Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse on October 12 to follow up on French advocacy with Francophone sub-Saharan Africans to bolster the Security Council candidacy of Guatemala (Ref A). Bonnecorse confirmed that he had already spoken directly on October 11 with Congo-Brazzaville President Sassou-Nguesso in the latter's capacity as African Union President. Sassou-Nguesso "got it," Bonnecorse claimed, adding that he had underlined Guatemala's legitimate credentials as a nation distinguished by the Nobel Peace Prize, and declaring, with regard to Venezuela, that the Security Council did not need an "entertainer" among its members. Bonnecorse had also reached out to Gabonese FM Ping, former UNGA President, who called back to report President Bongo had instructed the Gabonese UN delegation in NY to support Guatemala. Ping had portrayed the Venezuelan Permrep in NY in highly negative terms, Bonnecorse added.

13. (C) Bonnetcorse, affirming he shared USG concerns about a Venezuelan seat, pledged to reach out to additional sub-Saharan African nations, provisionally Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Togo and possibly others. He said he would ask Minister-Delegate for Cooperation, Development and Francophonie Brigitte Girardin to intervene with the Niger FM, a woman with whom Girardin had developed a friendship (Ref B). (Note: Presidential African Affairs Deputy Labriolle told Africa Watcher on October 13 that Bonnetcorse had spent the morning of October 13 working the phones with African leaders to emphasize France would vote for Guatemala. Labriolle noted that Central African Republic president Bozize had pledged his delegation would vote for Guatemala (Ref C). End Note.)

Darfur/Chad: Reticence on Interpositional Force

14. (C) DCM raised Darfur, asking about French thinking on the protection of Sudanese refugees in Chad. Bonnetcorse reiterated French concerns about the potential destabilization of Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.). As for a prospective interpositional force, whether UN or ad hoc, Bonnetcorse remarked on the emerging discrepancies between the views of C.A.R. President Bozize and Chadian President Deby. Bozize explicitly wanted circa 600 UN personnel on C.A.R. territory, and had personally appealed to Chirac for his support at the September 2006 Summit of Francophone nations in Bucharest. Deby however was now equivocating on international deployment; he had moreover signaled he only wanted African forces, and reserved the right to approve or reject troop contributors according to their nationality. Deby's attitudes were at present too

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volatile and unreliable for the international community to make international deployment in Chad the core of a strategy for Darfur, Bonnetcorse observed. Deby's equivocations aside, Bonnetcorse expressed misgivings about deploying forces into Chad but not Darfur. Securing the border and refugee camps (Ref D) could paradoxically prompt a further exodus of refugees from Sudan, posing a further burden to Chadian stability and consolidating, if not accelerating, the Janjaweed program of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. (Note: MFA AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le Gal told Africa Watcher on October 16 that the MFA did not know what to make of a recent cable from N'djamena reporting a conversation with Deby in which he had backtracked radically from his earlier appeals for outside help. She noted the Deby Government had previously sought EU intervention. End Note.)

15. (C) Bonnetcorse called for international pressure on Sudanese President Bashir to implement UNSCR 1706. He urged the USG to try to modify the position of the Egyptian government on UNSCR 1706. Bonnetcorse emphasized the need to demonstrate the advantages and incentives of a UN mission in order to overcome the current phase of rhetorical posturing. Bonnetcorse had recently met with Bashir's adviser Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin, who called for a "third way," i.e. an alternative to UNSCR 1706 or the continuation of the status quo with the African Union mission. Ghazi, according to Bonnetcorse, complained that the UNMIS mandate for Darfur under UNSCR 1706 reinforced the impression that Sudan was a failed state. Bonnetcorse remarked that Arab states have lost confidence in the UN. Moreover, there is Arab confusion about the U.S. agenda in Sudan, particularly, he added, given the initial strong backing by the USG for Darfur rebel groups. If the UN intervenes, Ghazi warned that the Darfur Arab populations -- by which he did not mean the Janjaweed -- would rise up and give succor to Al Qaeda elements. Proposals for NATO collaboration with the UN were unsettling for Arabs, Bonnetcorse suggested, with reference to the NATO SYG's offer of assistance to AU President Sassou-Nguesso. Deputy African Affairs Counselor Jacques de Labriolle cautioned against fomenting an Arab-Black African split. Egypt was ready to

mediate, he suggested, but not in order to foist an antagonistic solution on Khartoum.

Cote d'Ivoire: Empower the UN Elections Effort

16. (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, Bonnetcorse and Labriolle expressed their relief that the actual 6 October ECOWAS recommendations to the AU were more positive than indicated by the ECOWAS communique and press leaks (Ref E). (Comment: Previous MFA conversations had been more downbeat (Ref F). End Comment.)

The 10/17 AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa needed to strengthen the message further. For Bonnetcorse, the roadmap on Cote d'Ivoire should entail: a) augmented authority for the Prime Minister, such as the power to sign decrees in lieu of the President; b) charting a sound electoral process, which required greater empowerment for SYG High Representative on Elections Gerard Stoudmann; and c) sanctions for Afi N'guessan and Koulibaly (with Bonnetcorse noting the importance of a USG demarche to Ghana to lift its hold at the UN Sanctions Committee (Ref G).) Bonnetcorse explained that Stoudmann had insufficient staff and resources in Abidjan because his budget derived from UNDP. All UNSC delegations, with the exception of USUN, agreed on the need to rectify Studman's resource situation by shifting budgetary responsibility directly to the Department of Political Affairs at the UN in New York, he said.

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